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Applied general equilibrium (AGE) analysis is often found to under-predict the increases in trade 
and economic growth that result from trade liberalization.  One potential reason is that 
conventional AGE models ignore the strong correlations that exist between firm productivity, on 
the one hand, and exporting, importing, and investment, on the other.  To examine this 
possibility, this study incorporates econometric evidence of these linkages into the dynamic 
Global Trade Analysis Project AGE model, and then uses this model to analyze a recently 
proposed East Asian free trade agreement.  While conventional AGE modeling effects are found 
to predominate and be reinforced by the productivity effects, in some cases the latter actually 
reverse the changes predicted by the conventional effects.  
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Despite the economic arguments in favor of conducting trade negotiations multilaterally 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), there have been more than 100 
regional trade agreements signed since the WTO was created in 1995 (WTO, 2002).  The 
European Union, for example, signed regional trade agreements with 20 nations between 1991 
and 2001 – most of them developing countries (WTO, 2002).  Not to be left out, the United States 
continues to explore the possibility of extending NAFTA (the North America Free Trade 
Agreement) further to the South, with a free trade agreement of the Americas as the ultimate goal.  
A free trade agreement between U.S. and Chile was recently concluded and discussions are under 
way with the Central American nations.  Now the boom in regional agreements has spread to East 
Asia.  Officials from ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) and China, for 
example, have endorsed the concept of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between those two 
regions.  Japan, long a staunch advocate of multilateralism, concluded an FTA with Singapore in 
2001, and is now actively negotiating other FTAs within the East Asian region, including 
potential agreements between: Japan and ASEAN, Japan and Korea, and even a Japan-Korea-
China-ASEAN FTA. 
Alongside this surge in interest in FTAs, there has been a corresponding increase in the 
number of quantitative analyses of such agreements.  Most of these employ Applied General 
Equilibrium (AGE) mode ls.1  There are several reasons for this.  In evaluating alternative models 
of NAFTA, Francois and Shiells (1994) conclude that AGE models are preferable to partial 
equilibrium approaches because the latter fail to capture the economy-wide nature of FTAs, in 
which some sectors expand while others contract due to competition for a common pool of labor 
and capital.  The alternative of macro-econometric models for FTA analysis is less appealing 
because they generally lack sufficient sectoral detail.  Additionally, since FTAs involve multiple 
countries by definition, it is natural to use a multi-region AGE model in these studies.   
AGE-based FTA studies are not without criticism, however.  For example, Kehoe (2002) 
has recently evaluated the AGE-based studies in the Francois and Shiells volume.  He finds that 
they greatly underestimated the increases in trade resulting from NAFTA.  This raises the 
question of whether there are important mechanisms that promote trade growth which are missed 
by AGE models.  One recurring theme is that AGE models under-predict the changes associated 
                                                 
1 These are also known as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.   
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with FTAs because they ignore effects related to productivity linkages, procompetitive effects, 
and investment dynamics. 
Many of these linkages are currently being studied in the empirical international trade 
literature, and we focus on three of them here.  First, it is well known that more openness to 
imports may result in a reduction in firm’s price-cost markups, and a movement of firms down 
their average total cost curve.  This  is often referred to as the “procompetitive effect” of trade 
liberalization (Markusen, 1981; Hertel, 1994).2  Levinsohn (1993) offers evidence on such market 
disciplinary effects for Turkey, and a recent study by Ianchovichina et al. (2000) provides 
econometric evidence regarding the procompetitive effects of trade liberalization in Australia .   
Second, exporting may also be associated with improvements in productivity (Bernard 
and Jensen, 2001).  Newly opened foreign markets may enable  domestic firms to expand such 
that they move down their average total cost curve.  Overall productivity may also increase 
because only the most efficient firms survive in the new environment.  Furthermore, there can be 
“learning by exporting”, which relates to productivity improvements result ing from the 
knowledge and experience gained in export markets (Aw, Chung, Roberts, 2000).  Although there 
is less theoretical literature to draw on than in the case of procompetitive effects, there is a great 
deal of new empirical work in this area.  For example, a recent study by Bernard and Jensen 
(2001) provides statistical evidence of export-productivity links for U.S. firms.  
Third, foreign direct investment (FDI) is another important channel through which trade 
liberalization can lead to increases in firm productivity (Blalock, 2001).3  For example, a 
multinational may share new ideas and processes with the local firm, and try to improve the 
efficiency and quality of local upstream input suppliers.  In addition to “vertical” technology 
spillovers of this type, there exist the possibility of “horizontal” spillovers, in which local firms 
copy the processes or hire away the staff of a competing firm acquired by a multinational 
(Blalock, 2001).  A recent study by Chuang and Lin (1999) provides econometric evidence 
regarding FDI-productivity relationships of this sort in Taiwan.  In addition, Hallward-Driemeier, 
Iarossi, and Sokoloff (2002) find strong correlations between FDI, exports, and firm productivity 
in five ASEAN nations, using detailed data from 2,700 manufacturing enterprises. 
Since conventional AGE analyses of trade liberalization miss these potentially important 
effects, the purpose of our study is to explore their contribution in the context of  one of the most 
important East Asian FTAs currently under negotiation, the Japan-ASEAN FTA.  We carry this 
out with a suitably modified dynamic AGE model, and using the most recent econometric work in 
the burgeoning field of empirical international trade.  However, given the uncertainty surrounding 
many of these studies as well as the difficulty in applying their findings to a specific FTA, our 
paper must be viewed as an exploratory effort aimed at understanding the potential impacts of 
these additional mechanisms.  By identifying which of these effects is likely to be most important 
in determining the overall impact of a Japan-ASEAN FTA, we hope to provide a set of priorities 
for future policy-oriented econometric work aimed at refining the estimates used in this paper.  
                                                 
2 Another import -productivity channel relates to foreign intermediate inputs, which may be cheaper, of a different 
variety, higher quality, or more technologically advanced, thereby improving local firm productivity (Sjöholm, 1999).   
3 So-called “new age” FTAs tend to include measures designed to facilitate FDI among member countries.  
Furthermore, by reducing the cost of investment goods and boosting rental rates on capital, FTAs often increase FDI 
independent of any facilitation measures (Hertel, Walmsley, Itakura, 2001).   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we outline the 
theoretical aspects of our methodology, including a description of the Dynamic GTAP model 
used in this study, and our implementation of the above productivity effects.  We then describe 
the data used in this study as well as some key structural characteristics of the focus countries in 
the East Asia  region.  Following that is a brief description of the baseline projection and 
experimental design.  We then proceed to an analysis of the importance of each new mechanism 
incorporated into this study.  The final section summarizes and concludes.   
 
I. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
I.A Dynamic GTAP Model 
Global AGE models account for intersectoral linkages within regions while capturing 
inter-regional trade flows, both of which are critical for the analysis of FTAs.  The GTAP model 
of global trade, production and consumption (Hertel, 1997) is a relatively standard, applied 
general equilibrium model, in which products are differentiated by origin, firms operate under 
constant returns to scale, and perfect competition is assumed.  Consumer demands are modeled 
with a Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) functional form that has been calibrated to own-
price and income elasticities of demand from the literature.  The GTAP data underlying the model 
feature extensive regional and sectoral coverage including disaggregation of service sectors and 
explicit treatment of international transport margins (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  
The Dynamic GTAP model was developed by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001), and 
is a recursive-dynamic extension of the standard multi-region comparative static GTAP model.  
This dynamic formulation preserves the salient features of the standard GTAP model while 
incorporating international capital mobility and tracking cross-country asset ownership.  In this 
way it captures important FTA effects on investment and wealth that are missed by purely static 
analyses.  To track these components, the Dynamic GTAP model supplements the standard 
GTAP data  base with foreign income data from the IMF Balance of Payments statistics.   
A disequilibrium approach is used to model international capital mobility, which permits 
reconciliation of the theory of investment with observed reality.  Economic theory suggests that 
saving is allocated across regions to those investments with the highest rate of return.  With 
perfect capital mobility, rates of return must be equalized across regions, but in reality we do not 
observe this.  Therefore we assume perfect mobility applies only in the very long run.  Investment 
is the result of the gradual movement of rates of return to equality across regions.  
A corollary of capital mobility theory is that if rates of return in a particular country are 
very low, investment will fall, and vice versa.  Implementation of this theory with real world data 
leads to a dilemma, however.  In many cases actual investment, as reported in the national 
statistics, does not correspond to that predicted by this theory.  For example, observed rates of 
return may be low in some countries (e.g., China) while observed investment is high.  Such 
discrepancies can be rectified in one of two ways: first, the data can be altered so that theory and 
data are consistent, or alternatively, the theory can be modified to more accurately reflect the real 
world.  In the Dynamic GTAP model the latter method has been used, by incorporating errors in 
expectations about the actual rate of return.  Thus, investment is the result of a gradual movement 
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of expected rates of return to equality across regions, but the expected rate of return may differ 
from the actual rate of return due to errors in expectations.  
In the Dynamic GTAP model, regional capital is owned by both domestic households and 
by foreign households via a “global trust”.  The saving of each regional household is then 
allocated either to domestic investment or to foreign investment.  This allocation assumes that the 
shares of domestic and foreign investments are held constant, subject to the adding-up constraints 
required to ensure regional saving and investment constraints.  This is consistent with empirical 
evidence that investors tend to invest in their home economies first, and then abroad.  Explicit 
modeling of the ownership of regional investment allows for determination of the accumulation 
of wealth by foreigners.  In addition, the ownership of domestic and foreign assets can also be 
tracked.  Income accruing from the ownership of these foreign and domestic assets can then be 
appropriately incorporated into total regional income.   
In this section we have seen that the Dynamic GTAP model captures a number of 
mechanisms missed in conventional comparative static AGE analyses of FTAs.  We now turn to a 
description concerning how we implement the three new linkages into the Dynamic GTAP 
model.  We begin with the “procompetitive effects” linkage, since this is the area with the 
greatest amount of theoretical support.   
 
I.B Procompetitive Effects 
Ever since the path-breaking work of Rick Harris (1984), it has become increasingly 
common to incorporate imperfect competition and scale economies into AGE models.  Harris’ 
work on the Canada-US FTA emphasized the potential gains in scale economies from 
disciplining domestic markups, forcing exit of many Canadian manufacturers and pushing the 
remaining firms down their average total cost curve.  The potential importance of introducing 
these features in the context of the Japan-ASEAN FTA follows from the high degree of 
concentration in some of the ASEAN manufacturing sectors, as well as the inefficient scale of 
production in the import-competing manufacturing sectors of most developing countries 
(Devarajan and Rodrik , 1991).   
A survey of the issues that arise in modeling imperfect competition in AGE models is 
offered by Francois and Roland-Holst (1997).4  Once one chooses to move this direction, there is 
a bewildering array of choices that must be confronted: (a) entry or no-entry? (b) Bertrand or 
Cournot oligopoly, or perhaps Monopolistic Competition? (c) product differentiation by firm 
(Dixit-Stiglitz) or by nation (i.e. Armington)?, (d) market segmentation or integration?  Empirical 
work to date offers very little basis for discriminating between these alternative specifications.  
Compounding this problem is the fact that, depending on the assumptions invoked, the findings 
can be reversed (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1988).  Once one has determined the appropriate 
market structure, there still remains the non-trivial task of model calibration to observed markups 
and unexploited scale economies.  Finally, once scale economies enter the picture, computational 
problems loom large, with multiple equilibria  becoming much more likely.  
Of course, just because it is hard does not mean that such work should be avoided.  It 
does mean, however, that work in this area requires careful theoretical consideration, and it must 
                                                 
4 Francois (1998) has also made a wide variety of these approaches readily available within the GTAP framework. 
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be tailored to the issue at hand.  In light of our overall objective, we choose to focus on those 
industries where there is the greatest likelihood of procompetitive effects stemming from the 
reduction of bilateral tariff under a Japan-ASEAN FTA.  We first observe that a Japan-ASEAN 
FTA is likely to have little procompetitive effect on Japanese manufacturing, since Japanese 
tariffs are already very low, excepting for light manufactures where scale economies are unlikely 
to be significant, particularly given the size of the domestic market in Japan.  On the other hand, 
manufactures tariffs in ASEAN are considerably higher (Table 3), domestic markets are smaller, 
and the presence of Japanese imports is quite important (Table 2).  Thus we focus our attention in 
this paper on the potential for procompetitive effects in the ASEAN manufacturing sectors.  
Within the ASEAN manufacturing sectors, we believe that those sectors which are 
already heavily involved in exporting (e.g. textiles and apparel in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Philippines, see Table 1) are likely to have few remaining unexploited scale economies.  On 
the other hand, in the case of those industries where most domestic consumption is supplied by 
imports (e.g. automobiles in Indonesia, Table 1) and which are also protected by substantial 
tariffs, we expect significant potential for procompetitive effects.  Therefore, we adopt a model of 
import-competing domestic industries and apply this to all ASEAN manufacturing sectors with 
less than 95% self-sufficiency ratios (see the boldface entries in Table 1).   
The theoretical framework that we use here is that of oligopolistic competition in the 
presence of firm-level product differentiation (Hertel, 1994).  Foreign firms are assumed to leave 
their markups unchanged, so the import price falls by the full amount of the tariff cut.  Domestic 
firms incur fixed costs to produce a new variety, after which production is subject to constant 
returns to scale, so that average total costs decline with output.  Furthermore, we assume that 
displaced domestic varieties will be replaced by similar imported varieties such that the varietal 
impact on consumer welfare from the FTA is negligible (Case III, Hertel 1994) 5.   
With this model in mind, and simplifying the analysis to a two-sector, small, open 
economy model of one of the ASEAN economies, it can be shown (Hertel, 1994, Proposition 5) 
that welfare is an increasing function of the elasticity of the domestic markup with respect to the 
foreign price ( MFβ ).  This elasticity is itself a function of the nature of the oligopoly (e.g. MFβ  is 
larger for Cournot than Bertrand oligopoly), as well as the substitutability among varieties and 
market shares (Hertel, 1994, Table 2).  The mechanism by which this welfare gain arises is 
precisely that described above: lower foreign prices discipline domestic markups and cause 
output per firm to increase, with some domestic firms exiting the industry to restore market 
equilibrium.   
To be more precise, we have the following relationship between output per firm ( q ) and 
the power of the domestic markup ( M ) in the presence of domestic entry/exit: Mq F ˆˆ
1−Ω−= , 
where  ^  denotes percentage change and FΩ  is the share of fixed in total costs.  With the total 
number of varieties on offer fixed, the equation for markups as a function of relative foreign 
( Fp ) and home ( Hp ) prices is simply : )ˆˆ(ˆ HFMF ppM −= β , where MFβ  is the markup 
elasticity with respect to the foreign price, as discussed above.  Combining these yields:  
                                                 
5 Due to the “home bias” observed in the trade data, if we assumed otherwise, welfare would fall with the tariff cuts due 
to the high value placed on domestic varieties (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1988).  We do not believe that to be 
realistic in the case of Indonesian versus Japanese autos, for example. 
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)ˆˆ(ˆ 1 HFMFF ppq −Ω−=
− β        (1) 
which shows that output per firm is directly related to the markup elasticity, scaled by the inverse 
of the share of fixed costs in production.   
The presence of fixed costs, in conjunction with constant returns to scale in variable costs 
means that the elasticity of output with respect to composite inputs (z) is greater than one.  In 
particular, we have: zq F ˆ)1(ˆ
1−Ω−= , where 1−Ω F  may be shown to equal the Cost Disadvantage 
Ratio (CDR) (Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997).  So a reduction in tariffs lowers the price of 
competing foreign goods and so lowers markups, thereby boosting output per firm.  The resulting 
efficiency gain, expressed as a percentage of sectoral output, is given by qF ˆΩ .  Multiplying both 
sides of (1) by FΩ , we can write the sectoral efficiency gain as a function of the markup 
elasticity and the percentage change in relative prices6:  
)ˆˆ( HFMF ppefficiency −−= β . 
This reduced-form expression is incorporated into the Dynamic GTAP model to capture the 
essence of the procompetitive effects that might be available under a Japan-ASEAN FTA.  In 
order to keep the focus on the counterfactual FTA impacts, we do not implement this 
specification in the baseline itself.  Rather it only applies to deviations of foreign ( Fp ) and home 
( Hp ) prices from the baseline price path.   
The key factor in our empirical implementation of this model will be the size of MFβ .  
This could be obtained by assuming something about the oligopoly structure and number of firms 
in each imperfectly competing industry in ASEAN.  Alternatively we could refer to recent 
empirical estimates of MFβ .  In the spirit of this econometrically-based study, the latter approach 
is taken. 
One study which estimates MFβ  is that of Ianchovichina et al. (2000), who utilize a 
partial equilibrium model corresponding to the theoretical model discussed above.  These authors 
focus on the behavior of the Australian auto industry during a period of deep tariff cuts – similar 
to those faced by ASEAN members under the proposed FTA.  They obtain a fairly precise 
estimate of MFβ  = 0.44 for this industry using quarterly data.  This means that nearly half of a 
1% decline in tariffs will be absorbed by reduced markups, which is quite significant.  Indeed, in 
some simple, partial equilibrium simulations of tariff cuts in the Australian auto sector, 
Ianchovichina et al. (2000) conclude that a perfectly competitive model of this industry would 
likely overstate the output decline by 80%.  That is, by ignoring this procompetitive effect, one 
might erroneously predict nearly twice as great a decline in output as would actually take place 
following a tariff cut.  If this is indicative of the kind of impact that tariff cuts on Japanese 
imports would have on markups on ASEAN, then we need to give it further consideration.  
                                                 
6  For this procompetitive effect (as well as the export and investment effects) the “efficiency” variable is represented as 
ao(j,r) in the Dynamic GTAP model, which is the percentage rate of Hicks-neutral technical change in sector j of region 
r. 
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Of course, the auto industry tends to be a special case in the ASEAN economies, with 
very high rates of protection. 7  Additionally, since the markup elasticity depends on a number of 
factors, many of which are unobservable, there is no reason to believe that other sectors will have 
the same value of MFβ . Indeed, this is what Ianchovichina (1994) finds for several other sectors 
in the Australian economy, where her estimates for this markup elasticity are as follows: chemical 
fertilizers: 0.38, plastic materials: 0.22, steel pipes: 0.19, clay bricks: 0.0 and heating systems: 
0.0.  The high markup elasticity for autos is not surprising, since this is a highly protected, highly 
concentrated sector, selling a highly differentiated product.  The fact that chemical fertilizers 
exhibit such a high markup elasticity is more an indication of market power in an industry with 
very high entry costs, as opposed to a highly differentiated product.  Evidence on markups across 
industries, worldwide (Francois, 1998) reinforces the point that the chemicals sector tends to be 
quite imperfectly competitive.  The same is true for steel products.  On the other hand, it is hardly 
surprising that clay bricks show no markup elasticity.  These are undifferentiated products with 
low barriers to entry.   
Our approach to estimating MFβ  for the import-competing sectors in ASEAN relies on 
outside information about the relative size of markups across industries in non-OECD economies 
(Francois, 1998).  Our theoretical model shows that MFβ  is increasing in the size of the industry 
markup, so we use this as a guide for setting the relative values of this elasticity across sectors 
within the ASEAN region.  We next restrict the range of values for MFβ  in our model to the 
estimates obtained from Ianchovichina (1994), namely 0.0 to 0.44.  We then distribute the values 
of MFβ  over this range, according to the relative size of the sectoral markups.  The resulting 
estimates are as follows:  0.44 for chemical products, 0.40 for paper and wood products, 0.29 for 
metal products, 0.19 for the automotive sector, 0.19 for textiles/apparel/leather products, 0.13 for 
the machinery sector, and 0.13 for electrical equipment.  Thus, the highest markups, and hence 
the largest procompetitive effects are in the chemical and wood products industries, followed by 
metal products.  The other manufacturing sectors show lower markups, and hence receive a 
negligible procompetitive effect. 
 
I.C. The Exporting Productivity Effect 
In the case of the export-productivity linkage, there is little theoretical literature to draw 
on, and one confronts a fundamental problem of causality.  Are exporters more productive 
because they export, or are they exporting because they are more productive?  Bernard and Jensen 
(2001) attempt to control for this problem by looking at individual firms over time.  They use a 
panel data set covering 50,000-60,000 individual manufacturing plants in the U.S. for the years 
between 1983-1992.  They find that plants that always export during this time period are 8 - 9 % 
more productive than plants that never export, a result similar to those found in other studies (p. 
9).  While they find that exporting does not necessarily increase plant productivity growth rates, 
exporting is associated with the shifting of resources from less efficient to more efficient plants.   
Of particular interest to our purposes here, they find that firms that start exporting tend to 
have productivity levels above those that never export during the period, although significantly 
below those who export throughout the period.  As soon as firms begin exporting, however, their 
                                                 
7  The average rate of automobile protection in ASEAN is 32.2%, as opposed to 5.8% for all other manufactures. 
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productivity grows until they nearly reach the level of firms that were exporting throughout the 
period (Bernard and Jensen, 2001, Fig. 1).  At the same time, firms that were exporters at the 
beginning of the period, then stop exporting at some point, start out with high productivity but 
converge downward to the level of firms that never exported at all.  This indicates that there may 
be some degree of reversibility, such that firm’s relative productivity can diminish if they cease to 
export.  Based on these findings, if we assume that the number of firms in an industry remains 
fixed, we have a situation in which the overall technological prowess of the industry will rise as 
exports rise, but will fall in concert with decreases in overall industry exports.   
We incorporate this export-productivity linkage into our global AGE model as follows.  
Let 1>δ  be the ratio of the technology index used for export-oriented firms relative to that of 
firms specializing in the domestic market only.  Let Xs  be the share of output that is exported, 
and Ds  be the share of output that used domestically (note that 1=+ XD ss ).  Furthermore, let Xq̂  
be the percentage change in output that is exported, and Dq̂  be the percentage change in output 
that is used domestically.  Then, as shown in Appendix 1, we can obtain an equation for the rate 
of change in overall productivity in the industry as a function of the productivity differential 












−−= .  
Based on Bernard and Jensen’s (2001) calculations and our definition of δ , we calibrate 
the  exporting sector to be 8% more productive, giving rise to =δ 1.08.  Therefore, when the rate 
of change in exported output exceeds that of output for domestic consumption ( DX qq ˆˆ > ), the 
average level of technology in the industry rises (i.e., the efficiency variable is positive).  Note 
that this formulation can also induce efficiency losses when exported output declines relative to 
output for domestic consumption, since technological gains are reversible (as was found by 
Bernard and Jensen).  As with the procompetitive effect, this efficiency effect is incorporated into 
the Dynamic GTAP model as a reduced form representation of the more complex underlying 
process by which exporting affects firm level productivity.  Furthermore, this export-productivity 
linkage only applies to the export and output deviations from the baseline, not to the baseline 
itself. 
 
I.D The FDI-Productivity Effect 
Increased levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) have the potential to transfer 
technology and managerial skills to a host country, thereby enhancing productivity (Blalock, 
2001).  Some authors, such as Rodrik (1999) , point out that there is little hard evidence for the 
more extravagant claims linking FDI and productivity.  However, an increasing number of studies 
confirm that there are indeed significant, positive technological spillovers, even if we cannot 
always identify the precise mechanism through which this works.  For example, in a study of 
FDI, research and development (R&D), and spillover efficiency in Taiwan, Chuang and Lin  
(1999) use firm level data to confirm the existence of beneficial spillovers from FDI.  Specifically 
they find that a 1.0% increase in an industry’s FDI ratio produces a 1.40% to 1.88% increase in 
domestic firm productivity.   
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As indicated earlier, in the Dynamic GTAP model regional capital is owned by domestic 
and foreign households via a global trust.  This relationship is: =V  FH VV + , where V  is the 
equity value of firms in a given country, and HV  and FV  are the domestic- and foreign-held 
components of V , respectively.  Thus we can write the foreign equity share as: VVFF ≡θ .  We 
use this as a proxy for the share of FDI in total capital stock.  Since we want to relate productivity 
changes to changes in Fθ , we totally differentiate this to get: =Fθ̂  −FV̂  V̂ .  Using Chuang and 
Lin’s (1999) lower bound estimate, we can write the percentage change in productivity associated 
with a capital inflow from abroad as:  
 )ˆˆ(014.0  VVefficiency F −= . 
As with Chuang and Lin’s study, we implement this reduced form relationship only for 
manufacturing sectors and incorporate it into the Dynamic GTAP model an additiona l equation 
determining the change in efficiency endogenously as a function of changes in the share of 
foreign ownership , owing to the FTA.  We do not incorporate this productivity effect into the 
dynamic baseline.  It only plays a role in the FTA counterfactual, and efficiency changing as a 
function of changes in the share of FDI, relate to the baseline.   
 
II. DATA AND PROCEDURES 
II.A Data and Aggregation 
In this analysis we employ the GTAP Version 5 database, which has a base year of 1997 
and distinguishes 57 sectors and 66 regions (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  Among its 
notable features are disaggregation of service sectors, and explicit treatment of international 
transport margins.  We aggregate the GTAP data up to 23 sectors and 19 regions (see Appendices 
2 and 3, respectively).8  Our regional aggregation emphasizes the individual countries involved in 
the proposed Japan-ASEAN FTA.  The GTAP data distinguish six ASEAN nations (Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam), and when we refer to “ASEAN” below, we 
refer to these six only.  While the GTAP data do not disaggregate Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Myanmar, these four nations comprise only 3.25% of ASEAN GDP (ASEAN, 2002).   
 
II.B Trade Flows and Tariffs 
In this section we use the aggregated GTAP data to provide an overview of the current 
trade and tariff relationships between Japan and ASEAN nations.  The data indicate that while 
ASEAN depends on Japan for about 19% of overall imports, Japan gets only about 11% of its 
imports from ASEAN.9  So despite their proximity, and dissimilarities in terms of endowments 
and technology (which may be a source of comparative advantage), these economies are not 
                                                 
8 In certain tables of this paper, we use higher sector aggregates (e.g., Food & agriculture) to save space.  Definitions 
are in Appendix 2.  The analysis is otherwise done in terms of the 23 sectors.   
9  Japan’s imports of goods and services from ASEAN nations totaled $52.3 billion in 1997, while Japan’s imports 
from the rest of world (ROW) were $395.1 billion.  ASEAN imported $81.2 billion from Japan, $276.2 billion from the 
ROW, and had $79.4 billion worth of trade within itself. 
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highly integrated, especially when compared to other regions such as Europe or North America.  
A deeper view of the current Japan-ASEAN trade relationship can be gained from Table 2, which 
breaks down the relative importance of merchandise trade with Japan for individual ASEAN 
members.  The top half refers to the percent of ASEAN merchandise imports that originate in 
Japan.  Clearly, Japan is not an important supplier of agriculture, resources, or light manufactures 
for ASEAN, as it supplies less than 10% of total imports in nearly all cases (Table 2).  However, 
Japan is quite important as a source of high-technology manufactures.  In the automotive sector 
Japan plays a particularly dominant role, with an import share of 60.9% for ASEAN overall.  The 
bottom half of Table 2 depicts the relative importance of Japan as an export destination for the 
different ASEAN countries.  Although this varies to a great degree across ASEAN countries, 
Japan generally plays a fairly large role as an export destination for ASEAN food and natural 
resource sectors.  To the extent that comparative advantage is a driver of trade, it would appear 
that Japan and ASEAN are natural trading partners.  Japan can play a role as a high-tech supplier, 
while the ASEAN countries as a group are presently well suited to meet Japan’s need for 
resources, agriculture, and light manufactures.   
Average tariff rates for all sectors are reported in Table 3.  Japan is quite notable for its 
protection of food and agriculture (52.7% average tariff), which is driven to a large extent by 
protection of its rice market (rice has a tariff equivalent of 409%), and to a relatively lesser 
extent, its service sector (22.4% tariff equivalents).  In contrast, Japan is fairly open with regard 
to light manufacturing (7.8% tariff), and its average tariff on high-tech manufactures is only 
0.8%.  ASEAN, on the other hand, is more open in food and agriculture compared to Japan, and 
more protective with regard to manufacturing.  This is particularly the case for the automotive 
sector, where tariff equivalents range from 38% to 48% for Vietnam, Indonesia, Ma laysia, and 
Thailand.  So there appears to be a large degree of complementarity between the two regions in 
terms of the benefits that can accrue from reducing tariffs.   
An alternative view of the level of protection is provided in Table 4, which reports a 
matrix of trade-weighted, bilateral tariffs across all commodities traded between country pairs.  
Looking first at Japan’s column, its 1997 tariffs on goods and services from the ASEAN nations 
ranged from 1.3% for Singapore to 13.4% for Thailand.  On the other hand, the top row reports 
ASEAN tariffs on Japanese exports.  While Thailand’s and Vietnam’s tariffs on Japanese exports 
were relatively higher, other ASEAN nations appear to be fairly open, at least as far as the trade -
weighted average tariff goes.  Note that in our FTA simulation, all Japan-ASEAN tariffs are 
eliminated. 10  Clearly there will be a fair amount of Japan-Thailand and Japan-Vietnam trade 
response on the basis of the relatively large tariffs in place on both sides.  
 
II.C Baseline Simulation 
Our policy simulation results are obtained by comparing the counterfactual FTA policy 
scenario to our baseline.  In order to have meaningful results, the baseline should reflect as 
closely as possible the changes in the world economy expected to occur over the period under 
study: 1997 to 2020.  The baseline used in this paper is built upon the work of Walmsley, 
Dimaranan, and McDougall (2002).  It contains information on macroeconomic variables as well 
                                                 
10  Table 4 also displays intra-ASEAN tariffs for 1997.  As shown in Appendix 4, these are reduced in our baseline 
scenario in the manner prescribed by ASEAN’s Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) reduction program.  
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as expected policy changes.  The macroeconomic variables in the baseline include projections for 
real GDP, gross investment, capital stocks, population, skilled and unskilled labor, and total 
labor.  These projected macroeconomic variables were obtained for 211 countries over the period 
for 1997 to 2020.  These projections for population, investment, skilled labor, and unskilled labor  
were aggregated, and growth rates were calculated to obtain the macro shocks describing the 
baseline.  Changes in capital stocks were not imposed exogenously , but rather were determined 
endogenously as the accumulation of projected investment.  Any changes in real GDP not 
explained by the changes in endowments are attributed to technological change.  
In addition, policy projections are also introduced into the baseline (these are summarized 
in Appendix 4).  The policies included in the baseline are those which are already agreed upon 
and legally binding (e.g. Uruguay Round commitments and China’s WTO accession).  Uruguay 
Round tariff commitments are assumed to be honored by all countries.  China and Taiwan’s 
accession to the WTO is phased in two periods : a period of pre-WTO tariff reduction for 1997-
2001, and the period from 2002-2020.  This accession also gives them quota free access to the 
North American and European textile and apparel markets by 2007.  However, the liberalization 
of these quotas is assumed to be heavily back-loaded with most of the liberalization occurring 
after 2002.  The CEPT preferential tariff reduction program among ASEAN members, and the 
Japan-Singapore FTA have also been incorporated in the baseline.  
 
II.D Experimental Design 
Once the baseline has been established, we are able to explore the impact of 
counterfactual policy simulations.  Our simulations of the Japan-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
involve four different model specifications , aimed at identifying the most important potential 
sources of productivity gain.  Simulation (a) involves complete elimination of tariffs among all 
countries involved in the Japan-ASEAN FTA (as well as removal of service trade barriers), but 
does not allow for the three new linkages described earlier.  As such, it represents the standard 
types of effects that a conventional, dynamic  AGE model would capture, including allocative 
efficiency, investment reallocation, and accumulation of capital stocks, as well as terms of trade 
effects.  The remaining three simulations extend the first simulation (a) by adding the three 
additional modeling effects one at a time.  Simulation (b) adds export-productivity effects, 
simulation (c) adds procompetitive effects, and simulation (d) adds FDI-productivity effects.  
These additions are cumulative in nature, and therefore simulation (d) includes all three additional 
effects.   
 
III. RESULTS 
We begin this section by introducing some shorthand notation regarding the productivity 
linkages we incorporate into our analysis.  In the tables discussed below, columns labeled “STD” 
are meant to represent the difference between the baseline simulation, and simulation (a).  As 
such, “STD” refers to the effects normally captured by standard dynamic  AGE models, including 
allocative, investment, and terms of trade effects.  Next, “EXP” is the difference between 
simulations (a) and (b), and captures productivity effects related to the potential expansion of 
export-oriented firms under an FTA.  “IMP” is the difference between simulations (b) and (c), 
and captures procompetitive effects related to the exposure of local, imperfectly competitive 
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firms to foreign competition.  Finally, “FDI” is the difference between simulations (c) and (d), 
and refers to productivity effects related to foreign investment in local firms.   
 
III.A Welfare and GDP Impacts of the FTA 
Table 5 reports regional welfare changes in the year 2020 resulting from the hypothesized 
Japan-ASEAN free trade agreement.  “Welfare” is defined as the percentage change in utility of a 
representative regional household in 2020 owing to the FTA.  Consider first the change in welfare 
with all effects in place (i.e., the results of simulation (d)).  These are reported in the “Total” 
column of Table 5.  It is seen that all of the member nations experience an increase in welfare 
relative to the baseline.  In relative terms, Thailand has the most to gain from a Japan-ASEAN 
FTA, with a welfare level that is 3.32 percentage points above the baseline scenario.  For ASEAN 
nations as a whole , the welfare gain is 1.04 percentage points over the baseline, with Japan 
having a lower figure of 0.23 percentage points.  The nations that face relatively low barriers in 
Japan prior to the FTA, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and particularly Singapore (Table 
4), tend to experience smaller improvements in welfare (0.26, 0.24, and 0.46 percentage points, 
respectively).   
We can also examine how these results would differ had we not incorporated the 
additional productivity linkage effects.  Refer to the following columns in Table 5: “STD” 
(standard AGE modeling effects resulting from the tariff cuts), “EXP” (the export-productivity 
effect), “IMP” (the procompetitive effect), and “FDI” (the FDI-productivity effect).  In terms of 
utility, the contributions of these extra effects are generally  significant.  In fact, we see that only 
25% of the welfare change in ASEAN is related to standard AGE modeling effects (see values 
within parenthesis in the STD column).  This figure is higher for Japan (86%), due to the absence 
of procompetitive and FDI effects for that country.  Thailand shows the largest overall relative 
gains.  Here, the most important channel for welfare change is the FDI-productivity effect (1.34 
out of 3.32 percentage points), in which higher levels of foreign ownership following the FTA led 
to improvements in domestic firm productivity.   
We now move on to other macroeconomic results presented in Table 6.  Like Table 5, 
these changes are given as percentage point differences from the baseline, allowing us to gauge 
differences in relative terms.  We first focus on the total change in GDP (the other variables in 
Table 6 will be discussed in later sections).  While Japan’s 2020 GDP is only 0.14 percentage 
points higher than in the baseline scenario, ASEAN’s overall change is significantly higher (3.66 
percentage points), with Thailand having the largest change by far (12.41 percentage points).11  In 
Thailand, most of the change is due to conventional AGE modeling effects (STD), followed by 
the FDI-productivity effect and the procompetitive effect.  This is because Japan has notably high 
overall tariffs with respect to Thailand, and Thailand also displays relatively high tariffs with 
respect to Japan (Table 4).   
Figure 1 offers a temporal perspective regarding the changes in Thailand’s GDP.  Here, 
deviations from the baseline attributed to each effect are provided separately.  Begin by looking at 
the year 2006, the first year of the prospective FTA.  There we see that without the 
procompetitive effect (IMP), we would have underestimated Thailand’s GDP change from the 
                                                 
11 The small change in Singapore’s GDP (0.18 percentage points) reflects the fact that it has already formed an FTA 
with Japan, and thus does not benefit to the extent that other ASEAN nations do. 
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baseline by 0.8 percentage points.  While initially the procompetitive effect is the most important 
driver of Thailand’s GDP difference, by 2007 conventional AGE effects (STD) in the form of 
added investment take over as the most important contributor.  Also observe that the FDI-
productivity link (FDI) is unimportant in the first several years after implementation of  the FTA, 
but continuously grows in importance along with the increased foreign investment until it is the 
second largest contributor to the growth in GDP by 2020.  The sum contribution of all three 
additional productivity effects to GDP is 5.45 percentage points over Thailand’s baseline level in 
2020, compared to 6.96 percentage points from the standard effects alone.  On this basis it would 
appear that the productivity effects that are normally ignored in AGE analysis may indeed be 
important in the analys is of the Japan-ASEAN FTA, although one must bear in mind that these 
effects were somewhat more pronounced in Thailand than in the other nations (recall Table 6).  
 
III.B Effects on Trade and Foreign Capital Ownership 
Looking back at Table 6 we see that a Japan-ASEAN FTA results in higher overall 
imports and exports for all ASEAN nations, as well as Japan.  Thailand has the largest increases, 
which are 15.44 and 23.96 percentage points over the baseline for imports and exports, 
respectively.  In ASEAN most of the changes in trade volumes are due to conventional AGE 
modeling effects (STD).  Thus relatively little is missed by ignoring effects on productivity 
arising from increased exports, imports, and foreign ownership of firms.   
Table 7 presents a sectoral decomposition of the changes in Japan-ASEAN trade resulting 
from the FTA.  The upper half reports the differences over the baseline regarding exports from 
ASEAN to Japan.12  Not surprisingly, the FTA leads to a great deal more trade in nearly every 
category.  In relative terms, the biggest boost comes from increased exports of leather products 
(159 percentage points over the baseline, or $709 million).  In absolute terms, the biggest trade 
increase is in the Food and agricultural products, which increases by $5,064 million (77.5 
percentage points) over the baseline, followed by Electrical equipment ($4,537 million, 15.7 
percentage points) and Machinery ($2,789 million, 24.7 percentage points).  In all of these cases 
the increases are related mainly to standard AGE modeling effects (STD).   
Exports from Japan to ASEAN are given a big boost in general (lower half of Table 7).  
In absolute terms, the largest change derives from an increase in chemical exports by $12,018 
million (33.0 percentage points).  In rela tive terms, exports of textile and apparel products have 
the largest increase, at 187.5 percentage points ($1,264 million).  In both cases, the majority of 
the change results from standard effects relating to the tariff cuts.  This is related to the fact that 
Thailand and Vietnam had particularly large initial tariffs in these particular sectors (Table 3). 
(For a disaggregation of Table 7, see also Reviewer Appendix Table 1 and Table 2.)  
Recall from Table 6 that implementation of the Japan-ASEAN FTA results in higher 
capital stocks for all the countries involved in the FTA.  For these increased capital stocks, it is of 
interest to focus on the change in foreign ownership since this is hypothesized to drive the 
efficiency gain.  Table 8 reports the change in share of foreign capital ownership by 2020, 
compared to the baseline.  A free trade agreement between Japan and ASEAN attracts investment 
from abroad to all the countries involved in the FTA, resulting in higher share of foreign capital 
                                                 
12  Of course, changes involving ASEAN exports to Japan coincide exactly with changes involving Japanese imports 
from ASEAN.   
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ownership.  For Thailand the share of capital owned by foreign investor increases by 5.29 
percentage points, relative to the baseline.  The figure for Vietnam is 1.4 percentage points, while 
the remaining changes in foreign ownership share are all less than one percent.  The conventional 
AGE modeling effects (STD) account for the majority of the increase, but the procompetitive 
effects (IMP) and FDI-productivity effects (FDI) also contribute at considerable amount, 
particularly in Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
III.C Effects on Efficiency 
Table 9 reports the sectoral efficiency gains in the manufacturing sectors for ASEAN 
countries by 2020.  These values reflect the combined impact of the export-productivity, 
procompetitive, and the FDI-productivity effects (they are decomposed in Reviewer Appendix 
Table 3).  Here we see that the automotive industries of Thailand and Vietnam have the largest 
gains, at 4.50 and 3.44 percentage points over the baseline, respectively.  Recall in Table 1 that 
the self-sufficiency ratios for these sectors were well below 95%, so the procompetitive effects 
were active and indeed account for the largest source of efficiency gain in these cases (Reviewer 
Appendix Table 3).  While most ASEAN manufacturing industries attain higher efficiency levels 
due to the Japan-ASEAN FTA, some countries have sectors for which the agreement has no 
impact.  Interestingly, there are even slight reversals in efficiency for a few cases.  This happens, 
for example, in Vietnam’s electrical equipment sector (Table 9).  In this case, it is the import-
productivity (IMP) linkage coupled with the FDI-productivity linkage that gives rise to the 
technology reversal.  Following the FTA, a drop in foreign investment in the Vietnamese 
electrical equipment sector, and a re-orientation of the existing firms toward the domestic market, 
both contribute to a slight loss in overall sectoral productivity (Reviewer Appendix Table 3).   
 
III.D Effects on Sectoral Output 
Finally, we move on to consider changes in sectoral output relating to the hypothesized 
Japan-ASEAN FTA.  Table 10 provides this information for ASEAN in both absolute and 
relative terms, for the final year of the simulation, 2020.  In general, there are output increases in 
every sector in ASEAN.  Electrical equipment shows the largest increase in output over the 
baseline: $44,451 million, or 10.2 percentage points under the total column.  Moving across the 
columns of Table 10, we see that more than half of this increase is related to conventional AGE 
modeling effects (almost $30 billion, 6.85 percentage points), with the procompetitive effect 
contributing a difference of $6.4 billion from the baseline (1.46 percentage points), and the FDI-
productivity effect contributing $7.9 billion (1.8 percentage points).  Chemical products and the 
automotive sector offer two interesting cases.  Here, we observe negative impacts under the 
standard AGE closure (STD) (-$568 million or -0.32 percentage points, and -$1,805 million or -
2.95 percentage points, respectively).  In both of the sectors, the procompetitive effects (IMP) 
together with the FDI-productivity effects (FDI) are positive and large enough to reverse the 
overall output changes.  While these additional effects are important particularly for Chemical 
products and automotive, it is nevertheless the conventional AGE effects related to Japan’s tariffs 
that are the most important reason for the increase in output for most of the sectors.   
Outside of the manufacturing sectors, output by ASEAN’s Food and agricultural sector 
grows by $3.6 billion (0.96 percentage points) over the baseline, and the corresponding value for 
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the Service sector is $32.7 billion (2.04 percentage points) over the baseline.  ASEAN’s Natural 
Resources sectors have much smaller changes.  As with the manufacturing sectors, it is generally 
the conventional AGE effects (STD) that drive most of the changes in output related to 
implementation of the FTA.  (For a disaggregation of Table 10, see also Reviewer Appendix 
Table 4.)  
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Applied general equilibrium (AGE) models are extensively used in the evaluation of free 
trade agreements (FTAs), but they have often under-predicted the increases in trade and economic 
growth that followed FTA implementation (Kehoe, 2002).  Meanwhile , there have been a surge 
of new empirical trade studies demonstrating that there are strong correlations between firm 
productivity, on the one hand, and exporting, importing, and investment, on the other.  Since 
increasing these flows is a key objective of most FTAs, this raises the question: Might these 
additional productivity linkages have a significant impact on AGE-based analyses of FTAs?  To 
test this hypothesis, we generalize the Dynamic GTAP model to allow for the productivity 
enhancing effects of import competition, increased exports, as well as FDI-productivity linkages. 
We then incorporate the best econometric evidence currently available  and proceed to examine 
one of the most important FTAs currently under consideration, namely the Japan-ASEAN FTA.   
In general, we find that this FTA will result in increases in trade for most sectors of the 
countries involved, and that the welfare of all participating countries will improve. By far the 
largest proportional gains accrue to Thailand which currently has rather high bilateral tariffs on its 
trade with Japan. Importantly, we find that the effects normally captured by standard AGE 
models still play a key role in driving the results.  Our conventional, dynamic AGE model 
captures more than half of the ensuing GDP and trade changes. Overall, we find that the 
procompetitive and FDI-productivity linkages were the most important, with the export-
productivity linkage playing a minor role.  These added effects generally serve to reinforce the 
direction predicted by the standard AGE model. However, addition of the procompetitive effects 
does lead to aggregate output increasing instead of falling in the case of the two most imperfectly 
competitive sectors in the ASEAN region: chemicals and automobiles. Therefore, further 
refinements of the associated econometric estimates would be very worthwhile.  
We can think of several ways that our results could be changed by future research.  For 
example, the elasticity of productivity response to FDI employed was only 1.4 percent, and the 
estimate concerning the higher productivity of exporting firms was only 8 percent.  It seems 
likely that these figures may be higher for the specific countries examined in this study, 
particularly those within ASEAN.  Future econometric research concerning these parameters for 
the specific countries examined would facilitate the analysis of FTAs using the framework 
developed in this paper.  Additionally, sensitivity analysis concerning these parameters (perhaps 
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Table 1. Self Sufficiency Ratios, 1997 
 Sector Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Vietnam Singapore  
Textiles/apparel 122 154 124 113 77 51 
Leather 180 573 60 143 367 39 
Paper/wood  100 170 144 90 99 87 
Chemical products  93 87 91 70 38 97 
Metal products  52 68 58 59 36 56 
Automotive 75 39 63 27 5 50 
Machinery 71 39 55 36 36 60 
Electrical 
equipment 134 100 158 116 53 130 
Notes: Values represent the percent that domestic production has of total use. Boldface entries indicate self sufficiency 




Table 2. Relative Importance of Japan in ASEAN Merchandise Trade, 1997 (%) 
 ASEAN Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
 Percent of all ASEAN imports coming from Japan  
Food & agriculture 2.1 2.9 0.7 1.0 1.8 4.1 2.4 
Nat. resources 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.3 3.9 
Textiles/apparel 9.5 6.0 12.3 8.3 8.2 12.7 10.7 
Leather 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 4.1 4.5 1.3 
Paper/wood  8.6 7.1 9.2 11.1 6.6 9.3 5.1 
Chemical products  16.4 14.1 15.7 15.9 18.8 24.4 8.2 
Metal products  25.8 21.5 26.1 27.9 18.9 33.0 11.0 
Automotive 60.9 33.6 59.8 61.1 64.6 74.1 59.8 
Machinery 28.5 26.1 32.0 25.6 27.5 34.2 19.9 
Electrical equip. 21.0 18.3 25.1 18.2 31.4 24.7 18.4 
 Percent of all ASEAN exports going to Japan  
Food & agriculture 18.2 7.9 20.5 6.5 22.8 26.0 22.9 
Nat. resources 37.5 19.2 39.8 34.0 68.8 8.0 37.2 
Textiles/apparel 9.9 2.7 8.6 7.8 5.8 9.7 34.8 
Leather 6.0 9.3 6.4 1.7 4.5 3.9 8.2 
Paper/wood  25.7 7.8 29.1 24.9 19.2 30.1 27.8 
Chemical products  9.0 5.2 11.1 8.5 17.2 15.1 11.2 
Metal products  15.6 6.0 35.8 11.3 16.9 19.0 20.6 
Automotive 11.9 0.7 25.6 4.6 31.3 16.1 40.0 




7.6 12.6 7.5 13.5 13.9 8.8 
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Table 3. Average Sectoral Tariff Rates, 1997 (%) 
  Japan ASEAN Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Singapore 
Food & agriculture  52.7 15.8 9.0 21.0 17.5 31.3 32.3 4.3 
Natural resources  -1.0 0.7 2.8 1.1 1.0 0.8 4.6 0.0 
Light mnfcs  7.8 11.5 11.3 12.5 12.9 19.9 29.0 0.0 
High-tech mnfcs  0.8 5.4 8.7 5.3 5.6 13.1 14.1 0.0 
Merchandise total 7.0 5.2 6.9 5.5 5.3 11.5 16.5 0.2 
Services 22.4 6.0 6.9 5.2 6.0 5.9 6.2 0.0 





Table 4. Average Trade Weighted Bilateral Tariffs, 1997 (%) 
  Japan Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
Japan .. 0.0 9.6 8.4 6.2 16.8 17.5 
Singapore 1.3 .. 4.5 5.1 4.5 11.2 15.3 
Indonesia 5.4 0.2 .. 11.0 7.8 15.4 9.4 
Malaysia 1.9 0.2 7.9 .. 5.5 11.4 18.6 
Philippines 5.5 0.2 3.6 2.3 .. 8.3 4.4 
Thailand 13.4 0.2 8.3 7.4 3.9 .. 23.6 





Table 5. Overall Welfare Effects, 2020 
Region Total 
STD (% of 
total) EXP IMP FDI 
ASEAN 1.04 0.26 (25) 0.05 0.35 0.38 
Indonesia 0.26 0.11 (42) 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Malaysia 0.47 -0.06 (-12) 0.06 0.32 0.14 
Philippines 0.24 0.13 (54) 0.02 0.07 0.03 
Thailand 3.32 0.82 (25) 0.10 1.06 1.34 
Vietnam 0.62 0.22 (36) 0.01 0.25 0.14 
Singapore 0.46 0.15 (33) 0.01 0.14 0.16 
      
Japan 0.23 0.20 (86) 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Note: These values represent percentage point differences from the baseline scenario in 2020.  Figures in parenthesis 
are percentage contribution of standard AGE model effects to overall welfare change.  Abbreviations are as follows: 
Standard AGE modeling effects (STD), Export-productivity effect (EXP), Procompetitive effect (IMP), FDI-
productivity effect (FDI).   
 
 22 
Table 6. Effect of Japan-ASEAN FTA on Selected Macro Variables, 2020  
Effect GDP Imports Exports Capital  GDP Imports Exports Capital 
 Japan  ASEAN 
Total 0.14 2.83 1.54 0.27  3.66 4.03 6.24 5.71 
STD 0.15 2.73 1.54 0.29  2.06 2.79 4.46 3.61 
EXP 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01  0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
IMP -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02  0.77 0.43 0.98 1.08 
FDI 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.01  0.75 0.73 0.73 0.93 
          
 Indonesia Philippines 
Total 0.53 1.27 3.28 1.23  0.99 2.35 2.84 2.23 
STD 0.33 1.10 2.92 0.93  0.83 2.21 2.62 1.93 
EXP 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.10  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 
IMP 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.11  0.10 0.06 0.14 0.19 
FDI 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 
          
 Malaysia Thailand 
Total 1.56 2.46 3.36 2.26  12.41 15.44 23.96 16.22 
STD 0.73 1.91 2.59 1.26  6.96 10.15 16.44 10.19 
EXP 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.14  0.15 0.21 0.09 0.12 
IMP 0.47 0.20 0.34 0.55  2.56 1.77 4.11 3.03 
FDI 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.30  2.75 3.31 3.33 2.88 
          
 Singapore Vietnam 
Total 0.18 0.99 0.58 0.30  2.72 4.93 11.11 4.62 
STD -0.10 0.38 0.19 -0.23  2.04 4.98 8.27 3.10 
EXP -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01  0.06 -0.04 0.43 0.01 
IMP 0.18 0.30 0.22 0.32  0.50 -0.45 3.22 1.28 
FDI 0.12 0.30 0.17 0.21  0.12 0.44 -0.81 0.23 




Table 7. Change in Trade Volume Between ASEAN and Japan Due to Japan-
ASEAN FTA, 2020 
      
 Total STD EXP IMP FDI 
      
 Exports from ASEAN to Japan 
5,064 5,250 -13 -73 -99 Food and ag. 
( 77.5 ) ( 80.3 ) ( -0.2 ) ( -1.1 ) ( -1.5 ) 
-613 -512 -9 -51 -41 
Nat. resources 
( -4.0 ) ( -3.3 ) ( -0.1 ) ( -0.3 ) ( -0.3 ) 
1,458 1,362 13 50 34 
Textiles/apparel ( 73.3 ) ( 68.5 ) ( 0.7 ) ( 2.5 ) ( 1.7 ) 
709 687 3 19 1 
Leather ( 159.0 ) ( 153.9 ) ( 0.6 ) ( 4.2 ) ( 0.3 ) 
1,149 1,087 19 19 25 
Paper/wood  
( 16.2 ) ( 15.4 ) ( 0.3 ) ( 0.3 ) ( 0.3 ) 
359 221 3 114 21 
Chemical products  ( 14.3 ) ( 8.8 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 4.5 ) ( 0.8 ) 
635 476 16 109 33 
Metal products  ( 18.8 ) ( 14.1 ) ( 0.5 ) ( 3.2 ) ( 1.0 ) 
261 157 1 90 12 
Automotive 
( 45.3 ) ( 27.3 ) ( 0.2 ) ( 15.6 ) ( 2.1 ) 
2,789 2,234 51 238 266 
Machinery ( 24.7 ) ( 19.8 ) ( 0.5 ) ( 2.1 ) ( 2.4 ) 
4,537 3,327 25 539 645 
Electrical equip ment ( 15.7 ) ( 11.5 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 1.9 ) ( 2.2 ) 
1,206 1,151 -5 114 -54 
Services 
( 11.6 ) ( 11.1 ) ( -0.0 ) ( 1.1 ) ( -0.5 ) 
      
 Exports from Japan to ASEAN 
532 491 1 18 22 Food and ag. 
( 52.9 ) ( 48.9 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 1.8 ) ( 2.2 ) 
170 132 1 19 17 
Nat. resources ( 21.3 ) ( 16.5 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 2.4 ) ( 2.2 ) 
1,264 1,258 4 12 -10 
Textiles/apparel ( 187.5 ) ( 186.5 ) ( 0.6 ) ( 1.7 ) ( -1.4 ) 
32 32 0 0 0 
Leather 
( 118.0 ) ( 116.3 ) ( 0.2 ) ( 1.2 ) ( 0.3 ) 
550 541 -1 5 4 
Paper/wood  ( 62.7 ) ( 61.7 ) ( -0.1 ) ( 0.6 ) ( 0.5 ) 
12,018 11,926 32 -161 221 
Chemical products  ( 33.0 ) ( 32.7 ) ( 0.1 ) ( -0.4 ) ( 0.6 ) 
7,524 6,972 24 184 343 
Metal products  
( 47.8 ) ( 44.3 ) ( 0.2 ) ( 1.2 ) ( 2.2 ) 
8,850 8,993 15 -348 191 
Automotive ( 70.1 ) ( 71.3 ) ( 0.1 ) ( -2.8 ) ( 1.5 ) 
11,474 10,690 56 243 485 
Machinery ( 36.5 ) ( 34.0 ) ( 0.2 ) ( 0.8 ) ( 1.5 ) 
3,446 3,245 2 106 93 
Electrical equip ment 
( 18.1 ) ( 17.1 ) ( 0.0 ) ( 0.6 ) ( 0.5 ) 
312 258 2 12 40 
Services 
( 8.2 ) ( 6.8 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 0.3 ) ( 1.0 ) 
Notes:  Values represent differences in 1997 US$ million from baseline scenario in 2020. Values in parenthesis 
represent the corresponding percentage point differences.  
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Table 8. Change in Share of Foreign Capital Ownership, 2020 
(percent of total capital ownership) 
 Total STD EMP IMP FDI 
Indonesia 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.00 
Malaysia 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Philippines 0.82 0.71 0.01 0.08 0.03 
Thailand 5.29 3.15 0.05 0.96 1.14 
Vietnam 1.40 0.98 0.00 0.36 0.07 
Singapore 0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.06 0.04 
      
Japan 0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 
 
Table 9. ASEAN Sectoral Efficiency Gains, 2020 (%) 
Sector Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Vietnam Singapore 
Textile/apparel 0.86 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.06 -0.01 
Leather 0.93 0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.02 
Paper/wood prod. 0.83 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.04 0.13 
Chemical products  2.40 0.32 0.78 0.20 0.50 -0.05 
Metal products  1.33 0.43 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.04 
Automotive 4.50 0.73 2.02 0.78 3.44 -0.02 
Machinery 0.73 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.04 
Electrical equipment 0.94 0.21 0.10 0.02 -0.06 0.00 
Note: These changes are due solely to the EXP, IMP, and FDI effects.   
 
 
Table 10. Sectoral Output Changes in ASEAN, 2020 
 Total STD EXP IMP FDI 
3,595 3,539 2 143 -89 Food and ag. 
( 0.96 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.04 ) ( -0.02 ) 
311 228 14 46 23 
Nat. resources ( 0.22 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.02 ) 
6,436 4,505 84 824 1,024 
Textiles/apparel 
( 9.14 ) ( 6.40 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 1.17 ) ( 1.45 ) 
1,515 1,199 20 185 111 
Leather ( 12.50 ) ( 9.89 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 1.53 ) ( 0.91 ) 
4,051 2,635 145 570 701 
Paper/wood  ( 3.92 ) ( 2.55 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.55 ) ( 0.68 ) 
4,226 -568 185 3,127 1,483 
Chemical products  
( 2.38 ) ( -0.32 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 1.76 ) ( 0.83 ) 
4,673 1,839 195 1,622 1,016 
Metal products  ( 5.90 ) ( 2.32 ) ( 0.25 ) ( 2.05 ) ( 1.28 ) 
2,228 -1,805 163 2,445 1,425 
Automotive ( 3.64 ) ( -2.95 ) ( 0.27 ) ( 4.00 ) ( 2.33 ) 
24,300 15,632 668 3,495 4,505 
Machinery 
( 10.45 ) ( 6.72 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 1.50 ) ( 1.94 ) 
44,451 29,865 347 6,380 7,860 
Electrical equipment ( 10.20 ) ( 6.85 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 1.46 ) ( 1.80 ) 
32,702 19,083 714 6,540 6,364 
Services 
( 2.04 ) ( 1.19 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.40 ) 
Notes:  Values represent differences in 1997 US$ million from baseline scenario in 2020. Values in parenthesis 
represent the corresponding percentage point differences.   
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Appendix 1.  Derivation of the Exports-Productivity 
Expression 
 
We begin with the identity: ≡OOQA  XXDD QAQA + , where AO is an index of an 
industry’s technology, AD represents technology used by local market firms, and AX is technology 
used by export firms.  QO , QD, and QX indicate the total output, the output for the domestic 
market, and output for export.  Normalize such that 1≡DA , and let DX AA /≡δ .  We then re-
write the above identity as: =OOQA  XD QQ δ+ .  Totally differentiate to get: OOOO dAQdQA +  
XD dQdQ δ+= .  Divide through by OOQA , let ≡Ds  OD QQ /  and OXX QQs /≡ , and multiply 
















ˆˆ δ ,       (1) 
where the lower case symbols with hats refer to percentage changes (e.g., 
100%)/(ˆ ×= OOO QdQq ).  Based on the earlier identity we can also derive: XDO ssA  δ+= .  















       (2) 
Using the identity ≡OQ  XD QQ +  we can totally differentiate and show that =Oq̂  XXDD qsqs ˆˆ + , 
which can be plugged into (2).  With algebraic manipulation and the fact that 1=+ XD ss , we 
obtain the equation for the rate of change in overall productivity as a function of the productivity 
differential between exporters and domestic firms and the differential growth in these two 













== .   
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Appendix 2.  Aggregation of GTAP Version 5 Database 
Sectors 
 
.Table A.2.1 Aggregation of GTAP Version 5 Database Sectors  
No. Sectors in this study 57 GTAP sectors 
1 Rice Paddy rice, Processed rice 
2 Grains Wheat, Cereal grains nec 
3 Othcrops Veg., fruit, nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar; Fibers; Crops nec; Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
4 Meat  Cattle,sheep,goats; Animal products nec; Meat products nec 
5 Othfood Raw milk; Veg. oils and fats; Dairy; Sugar; Food products nec; Bev & tobacco 
6 Forestry Forestry 
7 Fish Fishing 
8 Extract  Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals nec 
9 Texwap Textiles, wearing apparel 
10 Leather Leather products 
11 Paperwood Wood products; Paper products, publishing 
12 Chemical Petroleum, coal products; Chemical,rubber,plastic prods; Mineral products nec 
13 Metal Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products 
14 Auto Motor vehicles and parts 
15 Machinery Transport equipment nec, Machinery and equipment nec, Manufactures nec 
16 Electrequip Electronic equip. 
17 Othservice Electricity; Gas; Water; Business services nec; Recr. and oth. services; Dwellings 
18 Construction Construction 
19 Trade Wholesale/retail trade 
20 Transport Transport nec, Sea transport, Air transport 
21 Comm Communication 
22 Insfinance Financial services nec, Insurance 
23 Pubservice PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat  




Appendix 3.  Aggregation of GTAP Version 5 Database 
Regions 
 
Table A.3.1 Aggregation of GTAP Version 5 Database Regions  
No. Regions 66 GTAP regions 
1 Japan Japan 
2 Korea Korea 
3 Malaysia Malaysia 
4 Philippines Philippines 
5 Indonesia Indonesia 
6 Vietnam Vietnam 
7 Thailand Thailand 
8 Singapore Singapore 
9 Taiwan Taiwan 
10 HongKong Hong Kong 
11 China China 
12 USA USA 
13 Canada Canada 
14 Mexico Mexico 
15 AusNzl Australia, New Zealand 
16 CSAmerica Central Am., Carib, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America 
17 WEuro 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Rest of EFTA 
18 SAsia Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia 
19 ROW 
Hungary, Poland, Rest of Cent. Eur., Former S.U., Turkey, Rest of Mid-East, Moroc., Rest of N. Africa, Bots., Rest 
of SACU, Malawi, Moz., Tanz., Zam., Zimb., Other S. Africa, Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saha. Afr., Rest of World 
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Appendix 4.  Baseline Policy Shocks 
 
 
Table A.4.1 Baseline  Policy Shocks 
Period Import tariff adjustments  Export tax adjustments 
1997 – 2000 
1. UR tariff reductions for all regions 
except China and Taiwan (no shocks to 
agriculture). 
2. Pre -WTO tariff reductions undertaken 
by China prior to 2002. 
 
1997 – 2005 
 
ASEAN’s Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) reduction 
program (1997-2003), and Japan-
Singapore Free Trade Agreements 
(2002). 
 
USA and EU quotas increased on exports 
of textiles and wearing apparel for all 
regions except Taiwan and China. 
2002 – 2007 
UR tariff reductions for all regions.  
China and Taiwan’s WTO agreement 
included (no shocks to agriculture, except 
for China and Taiwan). 
USA and EU quotas increased on exports 
of textiles and wearing apparel for all 
regions (including Taiwan and China). 
Notes: Japan-Singapore FTA and CEPT are added to the baseline originally developed by Walmsley, Dimaranan, and 
McDougall (2002).  Their study is otherwise the source that should be consulted concerning the baseline. 
 
